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Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral phi-
losophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally 
significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger 
(though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a 
novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our 
moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object is agential activ-
ity that is insensitive to basic moral considerations. When, only when, and insofar 
as someone is disposed to such insensitivity, they are a creep. Such insensitivity, 
especially in extreme forms, raises doubts about creeps’ moral agency. We distin-
guish multiple types of insensitivity, respond to concerns that feeling the creeps is 
itself objectionable, and conclude with a discussion of epistemic issues relating to 
the creeps.
Keywords: creepiness, the creeps, emotion, moral agency, moral insensitivity
1. Introduction
In the 2017 film Get Out, the black protagonist, Chris Washington (Daniel 
Kaluuya), visits the secluded family estate of his white romantic partner, Rose 
Armitage (Allison Williams). Although the Armitages, who present themselves 
as Obama- supporting liberals, initially treat Chris with some warmth, they plan 
to kidnap him and implant into his body the brain of an ailing white acquain-
tance, who bought the privilege at auction. This acquaintance will thereby gain 
control over Chris’s body, though Chris will, horrifyingly, retain consciousness. 
1. The authors of this paper are equal co- authors, listed alphabetically.
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Chris discovers their plan and that they have already given multiple white peo-
ple control over kidnapped black people’s bodies. He then struggles to escape.
The film arouses fear, moral disgust, and moral outrage, but responding only 
in those ways neglects one of its central elements: creepiness. Indeed, highlight-
ing the creepiness of the Armitages’ project is key to showing how deeply immor-
al it is. The film resonates with audiences, possibly (hopefully) because it awak-
ens or validates emotional understanding of the creepiness of white supremacy.
Portrayals of racism in American popular culture tend to focus on arousing 
indignation, anger, fear, disgust, contempt, guilt, shame, or pity. But instances 
of American racism— from genocide and internment to slave auctioning, from 
separating enslaved families to public lynchings and nonconsensual medical tri-
als, and from disproportionate police violence against people of color to racial 
segregation— do not warrant only those emotions. Because these racist practices 
are so creepy, they also make fitting an emotion known as “the creeps.”2
The creeps is also, and more familiarly, a fitting response to creepy misogy-
nistic practices, like stalking, flashing, and public masturbation. Indeed, the noun 
“creep” is often, even primarily, used to refer to people who do such things.
Reflecting on creepiness after watching Get Out motivates our asking precise-
ly what creepiness is and when feeling the creeps is fitting. That is, when does 
this emotion accurately represent its objects? Furthermore, are there conditions 
under which we should not feel the creeps, even if it would be fitting?3 As we 
discuss in Section 6, though feeling the creeps tends to be especially appropriate 
when creepy things’ strangeness, ambiguity, or unfathomability is salient, it is 
sometimes reasonable, or even imperative, that we feel other emotions toward 
such objects instead of the creeps.
Contemplating these questions has led us beyond the familiar but narrow 
conception of the creeps as a response to relatively insignificant (though dis-
tressingly ambiguous or unpredictable) social or moral transgressions. While 
intuitions may differ, we argue that the creeps can also be accurately directed at 
monstrous and unfathomable moral insensitivity. After all, central to the experi-
2. The creeps is in the same family of emotions as the willies and the heebie- jeebies; however, 
as Tyler Doggett pressed us to see, the latter two may be less serious, or even trifling feelings. For 
simplicity, we focus on the creeps and the evaluative property that it is about, namely, creepiness.
3. In what follows, we assume that the creeps is intentional (in being directed at or about 
something), phenomenological (in being a felt bodily experience), and epistemological (in being 
evaluable as more or less accurate or justified) (Deonna & Teroni 2012). However, we do not as-
sume any particular theory of emotions (such as perceptualism, judgmentalism, etc.). In our view, 
what distinguishes such theories is largely a matter of which feature is portrayed as central or fun-
damental, which is irrelevant to our purposes here, namely: to identify and defend (i) an account 
of when (not how) the emotion accurately represents its intentional objects, and (ii) a partial ac-
count of when feeling the emotion is prudentially and morally appropriate. On the distinction be-
tween emotional fittingness and other kinds of appropriateness, see D’Arms and Jacobson (2000).
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ence of the victims of many serious crimes and moral wrongs is feeling that the 
perpetrator is creepy as hell. Ignoring this distorts our understanding of morality 
and the seriousness of some mistreatment.
Moral philosophers, however, generally overlook the creeps, instead dis-
cussing how immoral activity can cause or make fitting anger, disgust, indigna-
tion, blame, guilt, shame, or remorse.4 We develop an account of creepiness that 
vindicates victims’ and their advocates’ experiences and shows why the creeps 
is an important moral emotion in its own right.
Indeed, since, as we argue, people’s creepiness is an insensitivity to basic 
moral considerations, and since overlooking creepiness is itself defeasible evi-
dence of moral insensitivity, failure to feel the creeps sometimes provides evi-
dence that one is (somewhat) creepy. So, inculcating the disposition to properly 
feel the creeps is imperative, though rarely recognized as such.
We begin, in Section 2, by introducing five paradigm cases of the creeps and 
identifying seven important features of the emotion that require explanation. In 
Section 3, we motivate our account with negative arguments against the view 
that the creeps is simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger. Rather, as we argue 
positively in Section 4, the creeps is a distinct emotional response to moral in-
sensitivity. In Section 5, we distinguish moral insensitivity from other types of 
insensitivity. In Section 6, we consider objections to our account and sketch an 
account of the conditions under which feeling the creeps is morally and pru-
dentially appropriate. The remaining sections are more discursive, since, to our 
knowledge, ours is the first philosophical account of the creeps, and discussion 
is needed to motivate future research. So, in Section 7, we highlight epistemic ob-
stacles to identifying creepiness and issues relating to communication about the 
creeps. In Section 8, we conclude by raising further questions about the creeps, 
including why it so often occurs in contexts of oppression.
2. Features of Creepiness and the Creeps
Consider some cases:
Statue: Entering a museum, you unexpectedly confront a statue so life- 
like that you suspect it is actually a person.5 You cannot help but imagine 
it moving. You flee, trying not to visualize it again.
4. The only extended treatment of creepiness we know of is Kotsko’s (2015) Freudian analysis 
of pop culture artifacts.
5. Consider Duane Hanson’s Woman Eating (1971): https://americanart.si.edu/artwork/wom 
an-eating-75123.
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Horror Movie: Some teenagers watch a horror movie about a weirdo who 
violently preys on innocent protagonists. He is just predictable enough 
for the audience to know when evil is imminent, but not enough to be 
easily identified, captured, or avoided by the protagonists, nor for the 
audience to know what he will do. The narrative, spooky music, visual 
effects, and darkened theatre make the audience distinctly uneasy.
Bar: A woman at a bar notices a man staring at her. She is not flattered 
and does not encourage it. Later, she sees him staring again, or still. She 
pivots, trying to block his vision. Yet he continues. She tries making lively 
conversation with others, but unable to focus, she wonders if things will 
escalate to a verbal intrusion, a drugged drink, stalking, sexual assault, 
mugging, something else, or nothing. Her distress increases.
Subway: You are riding an empty subway car at night. A passenger enters. 
Despite dozens of clean, empty seats, and for no apparent reason, they sit 
next to you (making significant bodily contact), without acknowledging 
you. You tentatively ask if they would mind moving. They slowly, delib-
erately face you and, grinning, ask if they are making you uncomfortable.
We can also imagine less familiar examples that share key elements with these 
“classic” cases, like:
Carnists: A vegan goes to a carnival where people are walking around 
eating the roasted legs of turkeys. Considering their neighbors’ happy, 
shameless gnawing on the charred corpses of sentient animals who were 
raised in dirty, crowded conditions and slaughtered for profit, the vegan 
shudders.6
One might feel the creeps in any of those cases, which exhibit seven features that 
any account of the creeps should explain:
 1.  The creeps resembles fear (or, in extremis, dread or terror).
 2.  The creeps resembles disgust (or, in extremis, revulsion).
The creeps is an aversive state, not a motivationally inert assessment. Despite 
some people’s enjoyment of fictions about creepiness, attraction to what one 
6. We use “carnist,” not “carnivore,” because (i) “carnivore” is a zoological (not culinary or 
ethical) term, and (ii) all humans are omnivores, strictly speaking. “Carnist,” like “vegan,” refers 
to someone who endorses a particular practice: for carnists, eating certain animals. See Joy (2009).
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feels the creeps about would be unusual.7 The creeps also feels somewhat like 
fear or disgust. It is not just any felt aversion, though.
 3.  Part of what is so unnerving about creepiness is the creepy person or ob-
ject’s (apparent) unpredictability or inexplicability.
Aversion to creeps is rarely focused on a specific danger, unlike fear of a vicious 
neighborhood dog. You often cannot tell exactly how, if at all, a creep plans to or is 
likely to mistreat you: the options are myriad (McAndrew & Koehnke 2016; Watt, 
Maitland, & Gallagher 2017).8 Due to the nebulous quality of creepiness, we may 
never be able to explain why an encounter with a creep elicited the creeps.9
Next, consider the noun “creep,” as used above. English speakers mark a 
subtle distinction by using it exclusively for creepy people, while the adjective 
“creepy” can modify objects, persons, and more. We call a stalker— but not a 
creepy doll, insect10, or institution— “a creep.” Feeling the creeps about a person 
(an apparent creep) involves evaluatively responding to their agency, specifi-
cally their moral agency. For aversion to creeps is not based on the same kinds 
of considerations as aversion to people who have the flu, play the violin badly, 
make foolish decisions, or have poor table manners. There are no morally in-
nocuous hygienic, aesthetic, prudential, or etiquette creeps— all creeps are moral 
creeps. Thus,
 4.  Being a creep is a moral phenomenon; experiencing the creeps toward 
creepy people involves interpreting them using moral standards.
So, while it is possible to feel the creeps in response to creepy things, we call 
emotional responses to creepy people the moral creeps. Unless otherwise noted, 
we use “the creeps” as shorthand for “the moral creeps.”
7. Though not impossible: see Rozin, Guillot, Fincher, Rozin, and Tsukayama (2013) on the 
benign masochism of taking pleasure in feelings like sadness or disgust. See also Menninghaus, 
Wagner, Hanich, Wassiliwizky, Jacobsen, and Koelsch (2017), and the accompanying thirty- two 
peer commentaries and authors’ response, on enjoyment of negative emotions in art. The paradox 
of horror is relevant here, but, engagement with fiction and benign masochism aside, when some-
one seems attracted to something that they find creepy, another motivation probably outweighs 
the creeps’ aversive element. Or maybe they do not feel the creeps at all; perhaps they simply 
recognize that others find it creepy and enjoy contrarianism.
8. According to the OED, “uncanny,” a word for a related phenomenon, originally referred to 
supernatural influence over physical things, or at least influence beyond one’s ken.
9. Thus, we occasionally find eye contact with non- human animals creepy, since their mental 
activity is sometimes especially inscrutable. In fact, according to the OED, the phrase “heebie- 
jeebies” originates in a 1923 comic strip’s depiction of a horse staring at a man, who retorts, “You 
dumb ox— why don’t you get that stupid look offa your pan— you gimme the heeby jeebys!”
10. Etymologically, “to creep” signifies slow, insect- like crawling.
196 • Jeremy Fischer and Rachel Fredericks
Ergo • vol. 7, no. 6 • 2020
Although we focus on the moral creeps, some creepy people share a key 
feature with creepy things: namely, ambiguous or indeterminate agency. While 
we do attribute agency to them, some creeps strike us as being near the bound-
ary of the community of moral agents— that is, the community of those who are 
sensitive to the basic considerations that should regulate social activity (Watson 
1987). While all creeps are agents, perhaps not all are moral agents; extreme psy-
chopathic creeps may be incapable of governing their activities in accordance 
with moral reasons. Whether they are inside or outside of it, such psychopathic 
creeps are near the boundary of this community (but still moral patients, wor-
thy of moral consideration and not to be treated as mere objects). Other creeps 
are somewhat further inside the boundary that divides moral agents from mere 
moral patients, but their creepy behavior may still sometimes raise doubts about 
their moral agency.
Similarly, though for superficial reasons of appearance, life- like dolls and 
animatronic figures might seem to be agents.11 As Statue illustrates, feeling the 
creeps can involve attributing quasi- agential features to objects. So whereas 
the agential ambiguity in cases involving creeps concerns their status as moral 
agents, the ambiguity in cases involving creepy things concerns their status as 
agents simpliciter. Thus,
 5.   Paradigmatic creeps include individuals near the boundary of the com-
munity of moral agents, such as unrepentant criminal psychopaths, serial 
killers, and sexual predators.
Such creeps seem (almost) completely insensitive to moral considerations. Feel-
ing the creeps comes easily when such insensitivity is on display, as in video 
interviews with serial killers like Jeffrey Dahmer or photographs of audiences 
celebrating public lynchings.
This moral dimension of the creeps, and in particular the significant damage 
that creeps sometimes inflict on innocent people, suggests a sixth key feature:
 6.   The creeps closely relates to anger (or, in extremis, outrage or  
indignation).
The creeps and anger seem to co- occur with some regularity; one can easily 
imagine victims wishing for revenge or retaliation against the creeps who have 
creeped them out. Third parties may also feel such emotions on a victim’s behalf.
Finally, creeps are heterogeneous:
11. For discussion of the “uncanny valley effect” that life- like faces can generate, see Moore 
(2012), Mori (1970/2012), and Seyama and Nagayama (2007).
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 7.  Not all creeps are equally creepy, or creepy in the same patterned way.
Some people are creepy in many situations, toward many people. Other creeps 
are more discriminating. An account of creepiness should explain and taxono-
mize these patterns. In practice, of course, determining whether someone is a 
creep (and if so, what kind) is often quite difficult. More on this in Section 7.
Next, we argue against three plausible accounts of the creeps. After doing so, 
we revisit horror movies to motivate our own positive account, which appears 
in Section 4.
3. The Creeps and Similar Emotions
Features (1) and (3), above, might suggest that the creeps is a form of fear about 
unpredictable danger. This fear- based account plausibly captures the confusion 
and terror associated with the creeps. However, it fails to capture the moral di-
mension described in feature (4). For tornados and earthquakes can elicit confu-
sion and terror without being creepy. The creeps’ moral dimension requires that 
it respond to an agent (or at least something somewhat agential). Moreover, it 
seems that one might fittingly feel the creeps about, for instance, the activity of 
a deceased or imprisoned person who elicits no fear. (Though even if the creeps 
always involved some element of fear, it would not follow that it is a form of 
fear.)12
Alternatively, feature (2) might suggest that the creeps is a form of disgust, 
a response to contaminants. This disgust- based account plausibly explains the 
creeps’ repulsive aspect. However, the creeps, unlike disgust, often involves con-
cern about attack. Unlike most physically disgusting things, people are creepy in 
virtue of their activity; features of their minds, more than their bodies, elicit the 
creeps (again, recall feature (4)). Second, concern about physical or social con-
tamination is not necessary for the creeps; for example, Dahmer is creepy even 
though his cannibalism was not contagious. Third, the disgust- based account 
fails to explain the unpredictability of creepiness (feature (3)), because paradig-
matic disgusting things (elicitors of “core disgust”), like rotten flesh, are highly 
predictable (Haidt, Rozin, Mccauley, & Imada 1997; Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess 
1997; Rozin & Singh 1999; Kelly 2013). Finally, while moral disgust might some-
times be fittingly directed at the flouting of norms against, say, casual littering or 
academic cheating (Plakias 2018), such morally disgusting activities are not (or 
need not be) creepy.
Feature (6) might suggest that the creeps is a kind of anger or moral indig-
12. Thanks to Tyler Doggett for suggesting this last point.
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nation about wrongdoing. This anger- based account plausibly explains why the 
creeps are rightfully directed at serial killers and rapists. However, while the 
creeps’ cold, withdrawing, or shrinking phenomenology resembles that of fear 
or disgust, it differs strikingly from the hot or expansive phenomenology of an-
ger and indignation. Moreover, the creeps’ primary action readiness mode is 
aversion, but anger’s is aggression or antagonism, which requires engagement 
with the offender (Frijda, Kuiper, & ter Schure 1989: 220– 221; Roseman, Wiest, 
& Swartz 1994). Thus, we say that the creeps often co- occurs with anger, but that 
they do not bear a particularly strong resemblance to each other. And they do 
not always co- occur. The creeps is sometimes felt toward (and can be a fitting re-
action to) ambiguously menacing behavior, even if anger is not felt (and would 
not be fitting). Consider, for instance, cases involving creeps who have not actu-
ally threatened, harmed, or otherwise wronged anyone (like, perhaps, Subway).
Finally, Horror Movie suggests that the creeps might be related to horror. 
However, many creepy objects of the emotion that Noël Carroll (1987) calls “art- 
horror” are supernatural— ghosts, werewolves, zombies, vampires, demons, etc. 
By contrast, the moral creeps responds to thoroughly natural entities.
Nevertheless, the creeps is in one respect importantly like art- horror. As 
Carroll notes, art- horror represents objects as “categorically interstitial, cat-
egorically contradictory, categorically incomplete, or formless” (1987: 55): for 
example, things that are both living and dead, humanoid and reptile, one in-
dividual and another (e.g., Jekyll and Hyde); animals with missing body parts; 
and gelatinous or vaporous creatures. While the creeps is not primarily directed 
at biological interstitiality, extreme psychopathic creeps are, we suggest, morally 
interstitial, incomplete, or disfigured. For example, some of what we (the au-
thors) find creepiest, like anti- Semitic Nazi propaganda, anti- Japanese American 
propaganda from WWII, and anti- black American propaganda, express views 
that are as morally disfigured as zombies are biologically disfigured. For they 
portray their targets as interstitial humans/non- humans to convey the view that 
some humans (and all non- human animals) lack moral standing. Such views are, 
simply, insensitive to others’ moral standing. Conceiving of the creeps as a form 
of horror thus makes sense of our remarks about creeps being morally uncanny 
and somehow near the boundary of the community of moral agents (feature (5)). 
So perhaps the creeps is a form of moral horror.
Part of Get Out’s creepiness, and perhaps art- horror, lies in how the Armit-
ages create hybrid people who literally embody a sort of double consciousness.13 
But the main creepiness of Get Out lies in the white community’s moral disfig-
urement, which causes them to overlook the dignity, autonomy, and well- being 
13. This does not map precisely onto Du Boisian double consciousness. Besides, Du Boisian 
double consciousness does not makes one a creep; on the contrary, insofar as it enables “second 
sight,” it protects against being creepy. See Du Bois (1903/2007: 3).
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of black individuals (whether by violating their bodily autonomy or through 
myriad microaggressions). The antagonists are people, yet such creeps that 
viewers strain to recognize their humanity. If they would do this, what would 
they not do? Pursuing their goals has a cost— moral debasement— reminiscent 
of what James Baldwin (1985) termed “the price of the ticket” for admission 
into the delusional realm of whiteness. The film validates the creeps that racially 
stigmatized viewers sometimes feel in response to the microaggressions (and 
worse) that pervade predominately white social spaces. Reflective white viewers 
must ask themselves: are these antagonists like me, or criminal psychopaths? Or, 
chillingly, are they both?
4. The Moral Insensitivity Account
We have listed central features of the creeps that must be explained and argued 
that the creeps is not a type of fear, disgust, or anger. Now for our positive account.
We propose that the creeps is fitting just when directed at creepy agential 
activity. Creepy agential activity, in turn, is activity that is insensitive to basic 
moral norms, reasons, or values. For brevity, we call such insensitivity “moral in-
sensitivity” or “insensitivity to basic moral considerations.”14 When, only when, 
and insofar as someone is disposed to moral insensitivity, they are a creep. Call 
this the moral insensitivity account of the creeps.
What precisely do we mean by “moral sensitivity”? Certainly not moral per-
fection. One might be morally sensitive and yet commit moral errors for which 
one is responsible and even blameworthy. For example, sensitivity does not re-
quire noticing moral considerations whenever they are relevant, because a sen-
sitive person can be in a complex situation or distracted in a way that makes 
noticing difficult. Moreover, one might be sensitive to moral considerations that 
one notices, despite mischaracterizing their nature or significance. Furthermore, 
sensitivity does not require morally appropriate behavior, because sometimes 
one notices and properly understands moral considerations, but simply fails at 
enacting one’s evaluation.
Defeasible evidence of moral sensitivity includes noticing, looking out for, or 
concentrating on a moral consideration; being confused about how to take it into 
14. We cannot here provide an account of basic moral considerations, but suggest, provision-
ally, that a moral consideration is basic just when it fundamentally grounds facts about an action’s 
moral permissibility. Candidates include well- being, being the subject of a life, rational capacity, 
and the capacity for sympathy and caring relationships. Candidates for non- basic moral consider-
ations include the value of gratitude and of generosity, which seem derivative of more basic moral 
considerations. Since we cannot settle the matter of which considerations are morally basic here, 
we also cannot settle all questions about the nature of moral sensitivity.
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account while knowing that one should; acting in implicit or explicit recognition 
of it; and regretting or feeling guilty that one cannot or does not act on it. Yet 
although being morally sensitive does not imply that one successfully respects, 
preserves, or promotes the value to which one is sensitive, such success is defea-
sible evidence of moral sensitivity.
In our view, one is sensitive to moral considerations just when one recog-
nizes and responds to them in a way that is not egregiously deficient or off base, 
which is to say: in a minimally reasonable way. By contrast, moral insensitivity 
is, or reflects, badly mistaken judgments about moral considerations. Metaphor-
ically speaking, morally sensitive people have their moral searchlights aimed in 
the correct vicinity of considerations, even if imprecise placement or poor illu-
mination leads to imperfect identification of or response to the relevant consid-
erations. They operate within a reasonable margin of error. By contrast, creeps’ 
moral searchlights are significantly off the mark (or, worse, intentionally extin-
guished). For while creeps do engage in mental activity with respect to moral 
reasons, they do so appallingly.
Moral sensitivity requires both reasonably successful concept selection (e.g., 
permissibility, respect, or care) and reasonably successful reference (e.g., to 
what is actually permissible, respectful, or caring).15 Simply using contextually 
relevant moral concepts does not guarantee moral sensitivity. For one might 
radically misapply them, like a parent who kills their infant out of a radically 
misguided view of what virtue requires in their circumstances.
Moral sensitivity also requires reasonably appropriate patterns of attention 
and perception. For a morally insensitive person might fail to notice how their 
behavior impacts others; we could call these oblivious creeps. An interlocking di-
mension of moral sensitivity is reasonable concern or desire. While oblivious 
creeps might fail to notice their impact on others because they simply do not care 
sufficiently about others’ interests, other creeps do notice the discomfort they 
cause others, but do not care; we could call these deliberate creeps.16
Different kinds of activity matter differently in assessing moral insensitiv-
ity. Assuming that action is typically more morally important than thought, an 
insensitive unexpressed thought may be very bad, as thoughts go, but less bad 
than an equally insensitive action. Even among actions, there are differentially 
important aspects that must be considered together to assess overall creepiness. 
A creepily insensitive, but relatively trivial aspect of an action (like, perhaps, vo-
cal tone) might render the action only slightly insensitive, provided that more 
important aspects (like, perhaps, motivation) are not insensitive.
This picture of moral sensitivity allows that one might misunderstand the 
15. For a similar distinction, see Arpaly and Schroeder (2014: 290).
16. Thanks to Angela Smith for suggesting this distinction.
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precise nature or import of some relevant moral consideration, and so respond 
inappropriately to it, without being insensitive. It also allows for degrees of in-
sensitivity (and thus of creepiness), since responses might be more or less un-
reasonable. Get Out’s villains are completely, habitually off the moral mark. The 
creep in Bar is also well off the mark, but much less so (either because he is insen-
sitive to values of lesser importance or because he transgresses the same values 
to a lesser degree). Moreover, what is unreasonable might vary with context. 
Fully virtuous people always focus their moral searchlights as they should, and 
merely decent non- creeps achieve a reasonable approximation of that, given the 
burdens of moral judgment.
This moral insensitivity account explains the seven central features listed 
in Section 2 that any adequate account of the creeps must explain. First, our ac-
count explains why the creeps resembles fear (feature (1)). For one thing, it is 
consistent with the earlier claims that they are similar both motivationally and 
phenomenologically. Furthermore, being the focus of a morally insensitive per-
son’s attention— or even just in their vicinity— puts one in a kind of danger. So, 
the creeps and fear often co- occur. For example, while creeps in bars often insist 
that their behavior is benign because women can decline their advances or leave, 
women know that such creeps are occasionally and unpredictably dangerous. If 
nothing else, such creeps are insensitive to the badness of the fearful discomfort 
that they reasonably elicit or to the moral norm against needlessly eliciting such 
discomfort.17 Consequently, they lack one barrier to anti- social behavior. This 
insensitivity provides reason— in addition to their otherwise discourteous and 
threatening behavior— to avoid creeps even if and when one is not afraid of 
them.
Our account also explains why the creeps resembles disgust (feature (2)), 
since moral insensitivity can be morally disgusting, as in cases of racism, mass 
murder, and gross neglect of the elderly (Haidt et al. 1997: 116). Some speculate 
that moral disgust involves or causes us to “step back, push away, or otherwise 
draw a protective line between the self and the threat” (Haidt et al. 1997: 127; see 
also Plakias 2018: 5462). This is precisely what moral insensitivity calls for (and 
why Get Out is an apt title of that film). Furthermore, cases of extreme creepi-
ness, like the mutilations in Get Out, can simultaneously be disgusting in a more 
fundamental, biological sense.
Our account also explains the creeps’ relation to anger (feature (6)). Moral in-
sensitivity is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral wrongdoing. One can do 
wrong, making anger fitting, while being morally sensitive— as, perhaps, in re-
17. Thus, the creep in Bar is not just violating a social norm. As John Draeger argues in a dis-
cussion of the creepiness of voyeurism, “because voyeurism remains troubling even in the absence 
of harm or deceit, we must pay special attention to the ways that complex social conventions can 
be used to show disrespect for others” (2011: 41).
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sponding to moral dilemmas or when overwhelmed by the burdens of judgment. 
One can perhaps also be insensitive to some moral consideration, say during idle 
rumination, without doing wrong— or at least not a wrong worthy of anger. But 
anger may be fitting when moral insensitivity does violate what we owe to each 
other, and the creeps may be fitting when wrongdoing is beyond the pale.
Furthermore, and crucially, our account explains why the creeps is not sim-
ply a subtype of these three emotions (as argued in Section 3). For the creeps’ 
characteristic intentional object (moral insensitivity) differs from the character-
istic intentional objects of fear, disgust, and anger (danger, contamination, and 
wrongdoing).
Our account also explains features (3), (4), and (5): that creeps’ behavior is 
unpredictable, that creepiness is a moral phenomenon, and that heinous crimi-
nals are paradigmatic creeps. Creeps’ moral insensitivity prevents them from 
properly attending to basic moral considerations. Thus, in their presence, one 
must guard against behavior that would strike morally sensitive people as un-
fathomable.18 Heinous criminals are paradigmatic creeps because we regard 
them (rightly or wrongly) as paradigmatically morally insensitive. In contrast, 
the stereotypical embezzler or burglar strikes us (rightly or wrongly) as morally 
misguided and culpable, but not insensitive to moral considerations.
What about the range of different types of creeps alluded to in our discussion 
of feature (7)? Let us now distinguish four types (we discuss an additional way 
to taxonomize creeps in Section 5). A creep simpliciter is largely and indiscrimi-
nately insensitive to basic moral considerations. Insofar as psychopaths are so 
insensitive, feeling the creeps toward psychopaths is the emotional response to 
them par excellence.
Domain- specific creeps are largely insensitive to basic moral considerations in 
some social domain, but are sensitive to moral considerations (perhaps even the 
same ones) in others. For example, Walter White, early in the television show 
Breaking Bad, does awfully creepy stuff in his business dealings during his initial 
moral descent to total creepiness, though perhaps not (yet) in his family life.19
Sectarian creeps are insensitive to basic moral considerations except regarding 
fellow members of their social group. So, a sectarian creep might disregard mor-
al considerations except as they relate to those who share their social identity.20
18. As Bernard Williams observes, “One does not feel easy with the man who in the course of 
a discussion of how to deal with political or business rivals says, ‘Of course, we could have them 
killed, but we should lay that aside right from the beginning.’ It should never have come into his 
hands to be laid aside” (1985: 185).
19. Categorizing people as domain- specific creeps requires extra caution, since apparent 
domain- restricted concern can be illusory. Someone who claims to love J. S. Bach’s music, but is 
indifferent to it whenever played expertly by buskers, might love high society concerts, not Bach.
20. See Lifton (2000) on doubling, which bifurcates the self, enabling people to contribute to 
sectarian atrocities while retaining a positive self- conception.
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Single- value creeps are insensitive to one moral value, such as autonomy, 
across domains. This might be the case with anti- social creeps, who are insensi-
tive to others’ discomfort and how their behavior might reasonably be perceived 
as threatening or offensive.21
However, due to their moral insensitivity, all creeps are disposed to activity 
that raises reasonable doubts about their ability or willingness to live with at 
least some others on moral terms. Consequently, their status as members of the 
community of moral agents may be doubtful or precarious; they are certainly 
moral patients, and certainly agents, but their moral agency may be questionable, 
underdeveloped, or non- existent.
Here, in summary, is our proposal. The emotion of the moral creeps can 
be directed at either activities (representing them as creepy) or people (repre-
senting them as creeps). The creeps about some activity is fitting just when such 
activity is morally insensitive. The creeps about some person, on the other hand, 
accurately represents its intentional object as a creep just when:
 1. It is directed at an agent;
 2.  In response to their general (but not necessarily total) dispositional insen-
sitivity to moral considerations:
 a.  Across the board (a creep simpliciter),
 b.  Within some social domain (a domain- specific creep),
 c.  As they pertain to some class(es) of persons (a sectarian creep), or
 d.  Regarding one basic moral value (a single- value creep); and
 3.  Their insensitivity calls into question or makes precarious their member-
ship in the community of moral agents.
Condition (1) precludes non- agential objects, like statues, from being creeps 
(though not from being creepy in a non- moral way). Since moral insensitivity 
reflects badly mistaken judgments about moral considerations, condition (2) pre-
cludes agents who are incapable of moral judgment (like, perhaps, crocodiles) 
from being creeps. However, even extreme creeps simpliciter with seriously im-
paired moral capacities are still capable of moral insensitivity insofar as they 
grasp moral concepts or can recognize moral distinctions. Condition (3) requires 
that creeps’ moral insensitivity be sufficiently significant to call into question 
their willingness or capacity to accept the basic terms of the moral community 
(to borrow language from Watson 1987).
That moral insensitivity requires the capacity for moral judgment might seem 
paradoxical. For thermometers need not be capable of making judgments about 
air pressure to be insensitive to it. However, the analogy is misleading. Moral in-
21. Thanks to Angela Smith for encouraging us to highlight such creeps.
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sensitivity is a failure, not an absence, of judgment. Unlike thermometers, creeps 
are agents. Agents, moral or otherwise, act for reasons. Agents’ activities there-
fore reflect judgments about reasons. Unlike a thermometer’s insensitivity to air 
pressure, morally insensitive activity reflects judgments about reasons that one 
can, in principle, be asked to defend. Such activity even includes not thinking 
about moral considerations, at least insofar as such omissions reflect egregious 
judgments about such considerations. However, while we maintain that moral 
insensitivity requires badly mistaken judgments about morality, we recognize 
that further clarification is needed.
5. Types of Insensitivity
To dispel a potential misinterpretation, we must distinguish between moral and 
descriptive insensitivity. For it might seem that we are implying, for instance, 
that neuroatypical people who have difficulty identifying others’ discomfort are 
thereby creeps. We are not. Contrary to widespread misinformation about autis-
tic and other neuroatypical people, they generally recognize the moral badness 
of others’ discomfort (and other basic moral considerations) and want to respond 
appropriately; they sometimes simply have difficulty reading the relevant cues 
or processing relevant information. Being insensitive to certain descriptive facts, 
such as that someone feels embarrassment or that shifting the topic of conversa-
tion would mitigate that embarrassment, provides no evidence of creepiness if 
there are adequate non- moralistic explanations of it, such as impairment in sim-
ulating, or applying one’s theory of mind to infer, another’s mental states. Only 
moral insensitivity constitutes creepiness. Insofar as they are generally morally 
sensitive, neuroatypical people are generally not creeps, though some people 
sometimes unfittingly feel the creeps toward them.22
Because social norm violations are creepy when and only when they medi-
ate moral insensitivity, and because moral insensitivity requires badly mistaken 
moral judgments, morally innocuous violations of social norms are not creepy. 
Some violations of social norms, far from being creepy, merely reflect cultural 
ignorance, say, of certain gestures’ meaning. Compare the original Subway case 
to the following variation:
22. In this section, we are discussing passive, innocuous descriptive insensitivity. However, 
there are forms of descriptive insensitivity that are neither passive nor innocuous: forms of mo-
tivated ignorance readily come to mind. By contrast, there are no passive or innocuous forms of 
moral insensitivity (see Section 4). For a discussion of active descriptive insensitivity that bears on 
moral insensitivity, see Woomer (2019) on “agential insensitivity.”
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Excused Subway: Someone sits beside you on an empty train, giving you 
the creeps. You ask if she would mind moving. Confused and alarmed, 
she apologizes, explaining that in her distant small town, travelers cus-
tomarily accompany each other. She apologizes again and changes seats.
Only in the original version of Subway does violation of social norms mediate 
moral insensitivity. For only then does social norm violation express insensitiv-
ity to the moral norm against causing or taking pleasure in the gratuitous non- 
consensual discomfort of others. Excused Subway involves mere (unmotivated) 
ignorance of social norms. Such ignorance does not reflect unreasonable mental 
activity regarding moral considerations, provides no evidence of moral insensi-
tivity, and is not creepy.23 The social norm violation is excused, but there is no 
moral insensitivity or wrongdoing to be excused.
Consider another Subway variation:
Justified Subway: As in the other versions of Subway, you gather your 
courage and ask the rider if he would mind moving. He apologizes, say-
ing that schoolmates were bullying him on the platform and all he could 
think to do was lie, telling them that he saw a family friend— you. He 
asks whether you would mind his staying with you for a bit.
The social norm violation here is justified, so the rider’s moral judgment is not 
mistaken, and the creeps is not fitting. You should stop feeling the creeps after 
hearing their story.24
Finally, it is useful to distinguish two kinds of moral considerations to which 
one might be insensitive. On the Aristotelian assumption that practical reason-
ing employs major and minor premises, “major premise moral insensitivity” 
(e.g., insensitivity to the universal claim that disrespecting autonomy is wrong) 
differs from “minor premise moral insensitivity” (e.g., insensitivity to the par-
ticular claim that my act disrespects Barbara’s autonomy). Both kinds of con-
siderations are morally imbued, so insensitivity to either is moral insensitivity. 
Major- premise creeps are not always worse than minor- premise creeps (and vice 
versa); this distinction merely helps us differentiate, for instance, (a) sectarian 
creeps of a type satirized by Get Out, who may be sensitive to the major premise 
that all persons have equal moral worth (at least insofar as they would explic-
itly affirm it) but still be minor- premise creeps insofar as they do not recognize 
23. Although mere social ignorance and moral insensitivity are importantly different, in prac-
tice, we often lack crucial contextual information necessary to sharply distinguish them.
24. Though you might not. The creeps, like many emotions and other attitudes, can be recalci-
trant. We cannot say much about recalcitrance here, but see Calhoun (1984), D’Arms and Jacobson 
(2003), and Brady (2009).
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the personhood of particular black people25 and (b) major- premise psychopathic 
creeps who recognize their particular behavior as disrespectful— and choose it 
for that very reason.
6. Objections and Responses
One might object that the creeps is appropriate only when directed at moral-
ly ambiguous behavior or mild moral insensitivity, such as that of anti- social 
creeps, and not when directed at grotesque moral insensitivity. If so, then claim-
ing that the creeps is appropriate in more extreme cases mistakenly inflates the 
concept of creepiness, and risks trivializing severe moral wrongs. Extremely 
dangerous or blameworthy activity, like that of génocidaires, one might insist, 
calls for more severe emotional responses than the creeps. Call this the conceptual 
inflation objection to our moral sensitivity account.26
We agree that the activity of criminal psychopaths and war criminals may 
call for indignation, outrage, fear, blame, and other emotional responses. But 
we deny that feeling the creeps in addition to such emotions would be unfit-
ting. Perhaps intuitions conflict regarding extreme cases. But, we suggest, some 
of this objection’s force may come from conflating fittingness and other stan-
dards of emotional appropriateness. For feeling the creeps can be morally or 
prudentially inappropriate even when it accurately represents its object and thus 
is fitting. We cannot enumerate all of the requirements for feeling the creeps ap-
propriately, but in this section, we defend five important ones. The first two, we 
suggest, defuse the conceptual inflation objection. The remaining three defend 
the moral appropriateness of feeling the creeps against a separate argument, 
discussed below.
First, in some high- stakes situations, feeling the creeps (as opposed to, say, 
fear) might be prudentially inappropriate. In such moments, what demands at-
tentive response may be danger, not moral insensitivity. But the source of dan-
ger might still be creepy, and if so, feeling the creeps later may be prudent. For 
instance, regardless of whether it would have been prudent for Trayvon Martin 
to have felt the creeps about George Zimmerman (a question we, the authors, 
cannot answer), prudence certainly does not forbid us from feeling the creeps 
about how Zimmerman pursued and killed Martin.
Second, feeling the creeps, even when it is fitting, might also be morally inap-
propriate. Plausibly, there is a moral norm that, ceteris paribus, when two mor-
ally critical emotions toward an object are fitting, and one cannot or should not 
25. See Mills (1997) on how people of color regularly have been and still are regarded as 
“subpersons.”
26. Thanks to Angela Smith for prompting this discussion.
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feel both simultaneously, one should feel that which embodies the more severe 
judgment. For instance, if Jeffrey Dahmer incessantly clicked a retractable pen 
while committing murder, it would be morally obscene to feel annoyance about 
the clicking rather than something much stronger about the murder. For that 
would imply (not logically, but informally) that the former is more significant. 
Similarly, feeling the creeps toward génocidaires may sometimes be morally in-
appropriate if it misdirects limited emotional attention toward their moral insen-
sitivity and away from their crimes against humanity.
These two conditions reconcile the insight that motivates the conceptual in-
flation objection with our moral insensitivity account of the creeps’ fittingness 
conditions. Feeling the creeps about extremely dangerous or blameworthy ac-
tivity can be inappropriate. But it does not follow that feeling the creeps toward 
such activity is always inappropriate, nor that it is unfitting.
However, one might grant that the creeps is sometimes fitting (in the way 
we describe), yet insist that feeling it always demeans people, thereby treating 
them as though they are not full members of the community of moral agents. 
Regarding someone (even unconsciously) as insensitive to moral considerations 
might seem to inappropriately banish them, so to speak, from said community.27 
People sometimes express this concern about attempts to achieve public ends 
that involve conveying experiences of the creeps. For example, this concern mo-
tivates some to criticize efforts to portray public figures accused of sexual assault 
or harassment as creeps in order to disempower them. Some objections to the 
mandatory registration of sex offenders also involve this concern.28 Call this the 
wrongful banishment objection.
However, feeling the creeps does not entail punishing or banishing (ap-
parent) creeps. Even when the creeps is fitting, social sanction (not to mention 
banishment from the moral community) might still be morally or prudentially 
inappropriate. Instead, engaging with or simply fleeing the creep might be pref-
erable, especially if evidence of their creepiness is scant.
That said, although we insist that there is sometimes sufficient evidence of 
moral insensitivity to (epistemically) justify feeling the creeps, we agree that 
feeling it without sufficient evidence may be morally objectionable. Morality re-
quires us to regard others as full members of the moral community and as at 
least as morally sensitive as we regard ourselves, unless we have very good rea-
son to do otherwise. On the other hand, the creeps’ function as an involuntary 
early warning system can be highly valuable. As with any such system, false 
positives are often preferable to false negatives, especially in contexts of oppres-
27. See Carroll (1987: 57) on horror’s geography: monsters often reside outside human com-
munities. See also Mason (2003: 257– 269).
28. Such concerns echo those considered regarding disgust and shame in Nussbaum (2010). 
For related discussion, see Alcoff (2018).
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sion.29 Thus, while extended observation of apparent creeps is sometimes im-
possible or imprudent, when reasonable, it provides some important protection 
against false positives. This provides a moral reason to avoid feeling the creeps 
impetuously and supplies a third requirement of appropriateness.
One might object that there can be no such moral requirement since one gen-
erally cannot choose to delay feeling an emotion. However, we assume that mor-
al responsibility requires reasons- responsiveness, not volitional control (Smith 
2005)— and the creeps is reasons- responsive. Even if feeling the creeps follows 
perception and initial judgment immediately, so too should its cessation follow 
reconsideration (emotional recalcitrance notwithstanding), as in Excused or Jus-
tified Subway. So, the lack of direct voluntary choice is no objection to this third 
requirement.30
The creeps’ reasons- responsiveness also supplies a fourth requirement: in 
feeling the creeps, one should recognize the possibility of error and be open and 
responsive to new evidence.31 (More on this in Section 7.)
One might object that even with these caveats, the creeps is excessively judg-
mental. Feeling the creeps creates social distance between oneself and another 
by calling into question their moral agency. It thus seems to violate a duty to give 
people the benefit of the doubt or to foster community and mutual care. Feeling 
the creeps might be an anti- social activity in itself.
We share some of this concern, which points to a fifth way that feeling the 
creeps might be inappropriate, despite being fitting. Considerations about the 
value of community- building or helping creeps reform themselves sometimes 
provide sufficient reason not to feel the creeps, despite ample evidence of creepi-
ness. Sometimes a therapeutic or objectifying stance is more appropriate.
However, it is also sometimes reasonable to exclude creeps from one’s com-
munity, and it is typically reasonable to exclude them from one’s society of inti-
mates. One virtually never has any obligation to go on a second date with anyone, 
let alone a creep. Moreover, and especially regarding creeps who perpetuate op-
pressive practices, socio- historical context may supply reasons to be especially 
cautious about including creeps in one’s community. Historically marginalized 
communities may sometimes be morally or prudentially justified in being more 
29. As the MeToo movement has insisted, false negatives can be catastrophic. Daniel Ellsberg 
offers another important example of a false negative misdiagnosis involving Henry Kissinger, 
about whom he remarks, “the man who, with his boss [Nixon], has dropped more bombs than any 
human being in history, bugging and lying as necessary, is perceived as a peacemaker, as a lov-
able wit, a charming fellow, as anything but the murderous creep that he obviously is” (quoted in 
Wenner 1973). For a fictional example, the Armitages’ performance of white innocence in Get Out 
(may) initially cause false negative misdiagnoses.
30. There are also good reasons to believe that we can exercise some voluntary control over 
the emotions we experience: see Roberts (2015).
31. For a similar claim, see Mason (2003: 253).
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reticent about welcoming members of oppressor communities who exhibit signs 
of creepiness.
Here, in summary, are five conditions that must be met for an instance of the 
creeps (even if fitting) to be morally and prudentially appropriate:
 1.   Feeling the creeps does not “swamp” (or distract one from feeling) an-
other fitting emotion about something of greater prudential significance.
 2.   Feeling the creeps does not “swamp” (or distract one from feeling) an-
other fitting emotion about something of greater moral significance.
 3.  One has a reasonable amount of evidence of the target person’s creepi-
ness.
 4.  One recognizes the possibility of error in identifying creepiness and is 
open and responsive to new evidence.
 5.  One lacks countervailing reasons for taking an objectifying or therapeutic 
stance toward the creep.
Although many instances of the creeps fail to meet these conditions, and so are 
inappropriate, it is a mistake to assume that feeling the creeps is always inap-
propriate. Creepy activity is morally serious, since it reflects radically misguided 
judgments about morality. Even if creeps cannot voluntarily control their creep-
iness, moral insensitivity involves agency insofar as it reflects assessments of 
the moral landscape. So, we can, in principle, legitimately ask creeps to justify 
their activities (whether mental or physical). We must not assume that creeps 
can never be morally responsible for their creepy activities, or that the problem 
is always in whoever feels the creeps. That said, we must strive to remedy the 
harms done by creepy activities, whether or not the creeps in question are mor-
ally responsible for them. And we must recognize creeps themselves as moral 
patients, questions about their moral agency notwithstanding.
Finally, even if they cannot directly control their moral insensitivity, treating 
creeps— or at least partial creeps— in ways that respond to how creepy they are 
respects their agency as partially or potentially not creeps. It respects them as 
people who could become more morally sensitive. Such treatment may involve 
simply feeling the creeps, but may involve more: judging that they are morally 
responsible, blaming them, expressing blame, conveying the creeps, or punish-
ing them.
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7. Epistemic Questions
7.1. Recognizing Creepiness
Whether while watching a movie or “in the wild,” properly registering creepi-
ness by feeling the creeps is a morally significant achievement, since it requires 
sensitivity to insensitivity.32 (Recognizing one’s own creepiness, not just others’, 
is especially significant, morally and therapeutically.33)
Because creepiness is a kind of insensitivity, creeps generally fail to recog-
nize others’ similar creepiness. This raises significant barriers to their recogniz-
ing prevalent forms of creepiness and makes it difficult for them to meet the 
epistemic appropriateness conditions (3) and (4) from Section 6. At the personal 
level, creeps seem more likely to befriend or identify with each other, since their 
creepiness is unlikely to be a barrier to their friendship, as it would likely be 
for non- creeps. Also, children may have trouble recognizing the creepiness of 
authority figures who habituate them into shared moral insensitivity. At the 
systemic level, creepiness in society’s basic structure and popular media also 
inculcates and obscures creepiness via status quo bias and other mechanisms.34 
Consequently, insensitivity to certain moral considerations often seems appro-
priate to creeps— and sensitivity seems ridiculous, perverse, or ominous, and 
thus they resist it.35
For instance, in a society that inculcates insensitivity to women’s autonomy, 
it is an achievement to recognize anti- woman creeps as creeps rather than, say, 
“good ol’ boys” or “awesome guys.” Many people in such societies will not feel 
the creeps toward such creeps and will regard those who do as perversely mor-
alistic or degenerate (e.g., as “femi- Nazis,” “soy boys,” “pussies,” or “social jus-
tice warriors”).36
Hence emotional “consciousness raising” is sometimes required to recognize 
the creepiness of, for instance, sexual harassment, and we cannot simply take 
the creeps (or the lack thereof) as a perfectly trustworthy source of information 
about what is morally salient. We must think critically to determine when the 
32. Though we do not defend these claims here, we think that appropriately feeling the creeps 
is required for full moral understanding of creepy activity and provides evidence of decent moral 
character. For these two claims, with respect to emotions generally, see Starkey (2008) and Taylor 
(1975), respectively.
33. See Yancy’s (2015) confessions regarding sexism, and Klein (2018).
34. There is likely significant cultural variation in what people regard as creepy. One of us, 
an American traveling in Morocco years ago, found it creepy to see café upon café with only male 
patrons— but many locals probably did not.
35. Thus, inquiries into creepiness are relevant to the epistemology of ignorance. See Sullivan 
and Tuana (2007).
36. See Roberts- Cady (2017) for more on normalization.
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creeps is fitting. But how does one discern whether the creeps is fitting if one has 
not been socialized to feel the fitting creeps, nor to think critically about creepi-
ness? How can one cultivate a tendency to feel the creeps properly?
First, one should look out for moral insensitivity, just as one looks for other 
morally salient features of one’s landscape. Our examples suggest that, when-
ever possible, this process should involve listening to and learning from people 
who have persistently felt the creeps, especially members of historically mar-
ginalized groups. However, we should not listen uncritically: some people who 
often feel the creeps may do so unfittingly, merely reflecting contempt toward 
or suspicion of people who differ from them. Given the gendered and classist 
nature of common narratives about creepiness, we worry that some highly privi-
leged women may be socialized to feel the creeps often and easily, even when it 
is unfitting and inappropriate.
If one does not know it when one sees it, perhaps the best technique for rec-
ognizing creepiness is inference to the best explanation. For example, Carnists 
(the case of the vegan who observes people eating turkeys’ legs at the carnival) 
involves people who relish adhering to popular culinary norms even though, in 
the age of industrialized farming, doing so causes great cruelty and generates 
well- known, though not widespread, outrage. One explanation of this exuberant 
carnist activity is insensitivity to the moral considerations that make eating ani-
mals prima facie wrong. Alternatively, one might explain it in terms of active or 
passive ignorance of the extent of the pain and death involved in torturing and 
killing tens of billions of land animals and hundreds of billions of sea creatures 
annually. To decide between these and other possible explanations, it may help 
to observe the extent of the carnist’s moral sensitivity toward humans and non- 
human animals not customarily treated as meat.37
Another possible explanation, sure to be considered by carnists, is that 
carnists are morally sensitive, vegan objections notwithstanding. In The Lives of 
Animals, J. M. Coetzee dramatizes the struggle to find the best explanation of 
such fundamental conflicts of moral judgment and feeling in the character of 
a zealous vegan who visits her condescending adult carnist son and his equal-
ly dismissive spouse. While driving her to the airport, Elizabeth’s son says, “I 
haven’t had time to make sense of why you have become so intense about the 
animal business.” The novella’s final conversation continues thus:
“A better explanation,” she says, “is that I have not told you why, or dare 
not tell you. When I think of the words, they seem so outrageous that 
37. On linked moral insensitivity regarding animals and women, see Adams (1990). Assess-
ing the moral insensitivity of carnists who neither participate in nor benefit from industrialized 
food production depends on answering many different questions.
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they are best spoken into a pillow or into a hole in the ground, like King 
Midas.”
“I don’t follow. What is it you can’t say?”
“It’s that I no longer know where I am. I seem to move around per-
fectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. 
Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of 
stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Yet every 
day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, 
exhibit it, offer it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have 
bought for money.
“It is as if I were to visit friends, and to make some polite remark 
about the lamp in their living room, and they were to say, ‘Yes, it’s nice, 
isn’t it? Polish- Jewish skin it’s made of, we find that’s best, the skins of 
young Polish- Jewish virgins.’ And then I go to the bathroom and the 
soap- wrapper says, ‘Treblinka— 100% human stearate.’ Am I dreaming, I 
say to myself? What kind of house is this?
“Yet I’m not dreaming. I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the 
children’s, and I see only kindness, human- kindness. Calm down, I tell 
myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is life. Every-
one else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t you?” (Coetzee 
1999: 69)
Elizabeth sees in her son’s family evidence of moral sensitivity and moral deprav-
ity. She questions whether her emotions are best explained by her own extreme 
moral error or their extreme creepiness. This struggle with emotional ambiva-
lence disorients her profoundly. Because feeling the creeps reflects judgments 
about basic moral considerations, the disposition to experience it fundamentally 
orients one’s moral sensibilities and even one’s self. This partly explains why 
disagreement about creepiness can be so intractable.
It also helps explain why growing social awareness of creepiness takes con-
siderable time, and why the strangeness of disagreement about obvious, pro-
found moral errors is sometimes most easily appreciated regarding the distant 
past. As Kwame Appiah (2010) asks regarding chattel slavery, lynching, and the 
denial of women’s rights, “Looking back at such horrors, it is easy to ask: What 
were people thinking?”38 This is the quintessential puzzle about creeps: how 
generally sensible, even kind people can be so morally insensitive.
38. In Appiah’s view, and ours, industrial animal slaughter is a leading contender for future 
widespread retrospective moral horror.
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7.2 Conveying, Extirpating, and Inculcating the Creeps
Overcoming the distinctive epistemic obstacles to recognizing creepiness re-
quires emotionally laden communication. Successfully communicating about 
the creeps creates a shared moral understanding of creepiness.39 Such commu-
nication is especially important for inculcating proper emotional dispositions in 
children.
Portraying creepy events and people as sad, gross, or enraging is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for conveying their creepiness. It is unnecessary because 
feeling or conveying anger toward creeps is sometimes unfitting. For creepy 
behavior is not always wrong; furtively peering around corners might evince 
moral insensitivity even when it does no wrong. Nor is creepy behavior always 
sad or gross.
To see that it’s insufficient, consider that conveying anger, blame, or rage to-
ward cannibal serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer need not involve or convey the creeps. 
In feeling the creeps, you respond to his moral depravity, which may lie beyond 
blame’s reach. For we suspect that (1) total creeps— like criminal psychopaths— 
are sometimes not responsible for their creepiness, and (2) blame at most reaches 
what one is morally responsible for. When someone is at most tenuously moral-
ly responsible for their evil, there may be nothing for us to feel or express except 
terror, pity— and the creeps.
Since sometimes the creeps should be felt and conveyed, extirpation of the 
fitting creeps can be both morally inappropriate and also itself creepy insofar as 
it undermines emotional barriers to becoming a creep. Public relations efforts 
designed to help children overcome their unease about eating animals— such 
as clowns who promote eating hamburgers, cartoon cows who urge us to eat 
chickens, and language that obscures the link between what kids find on their 
plates and the living animals they adore (e.g., “pork,” not “pigs”)— are especial-
ly creepy, being akin to propaganda designed to extinguish our moral repulsion 
to racist or xenophobic atrocities.
Inculcation of the creeps can also be morally inappropriate when the emo-
tion is unfitting. For example, anti- abortion activists often portray abortion as 
creepy. A newspaper article about efforts to close Kentucky’s only abortion clin-
ic quotes an observer who describes anti- abortion protests as follows: “There 
are the Catholics who stand vigil, saying the rosary while lining both sides of 
the sidewalk to create an ‘eerie and disconcerting’ gauntlet for patients to run” 
(Smith 2017). Such theatrics aim to instill the creeps about abortion clinics but 
39. For an appalling example of a failure to do so, consider Elizabeth’s son’s response to her 
anguished query about her inability to accept carnism as others do: “He inhales the smell of cold 
cream, of old flesh. ‘There, there,’ he whispers in her ear. ‘There, there. It will soon be over’” (Coe-
tzee 1999: 69).
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are themselves creepy. For, seeking or providing an abortion (even if it is wrong) 
is not evidence of moral insensitivity, since people typically give the matter seri-
ous moral consideration. However, regarding people who seek or provide abor-
tions as necessarily morally insensitive is itself badly morally mistaken.
8. Conclusion
Many questions about the creeps, creepy activities, and creepy people remain. 
First, does the mode of portrayal matter for conveying how creepy some person 
or practice is? For example, we suspect that graphic displays of factory farms’ 
and slaughterhouses’ customary violence (e.g., in the documentaries Earthling 
and Dominion) are especially conducive to eliciting the creeps toward eating ani-
mals. If so, what does that entail about creepiness or our capacity for moral sen-
sitivity?
Second, why does creepiness so often accompany oppression? Is it because 
oppression provides social permission to creeps? Because oppression renders 
some people relatively powerless, which creeps can easily exploit? Because the 
generalizing and stereotyping common in human cognition conduce to sectar-
ian moral insensitivity? Or perhaps because political and economic structures 
incentivize it?
Third, what can individuals and groups do to prevent creepiness in them-
selves and others? Relatedly, how should the public respond to and prevent 
creepy institutional behavior, especially regarding “big data” (Tene & Polo-
netsky 2013)? May institutions ever justly allow (or, as with publicly traded for- 
profit firms, require) moral insensitivity?
Fourth, how, besides by feeling the creeps, should one respond to creeps? 
Attempts to persuade, blame, punish, or reform might not be sensibly directed 
at people who entirely lack moral sensitivity, and full- blown creeps might not 
be moral agents at all. So, it is an open question whether and when any of these 
responses is advisable.
That raises a final, more fundamental question: does moral insensitivity al-
ways involve the sort of activity required for moral responsibility? If not, then 
under what conditions are creeps morally responsible (and so potentially blame-
worthy) for their creepy activity?
However we answer these questions, our treatment of creeps must be more 
humane than the, shall we say, undiplomatic treatment typically given to bio-
logical monsters in horror movies, who are generally killed by vigilantes. Even 
the creepiest of creeps deserve better than that.
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